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theory of reality, an objective characteristic, the other is a subjective attribute of the apprehending mind.

Finally, Dr. Hicks's second criterion appears really incompatible with his previous assertions that (a) "appearances will not have a mode of existence . . . separate from reality" (p. 33), and (b) "the external object is in no way altered or affected through the fact of being apprehended" (p. 46)—this object of course being real. For if now our awareness constitutes any content appearance, and if further this awareness is "in and through the apprehending act," then it seems to be a perfectly logical conclusion that ultimately it is the apprehending act that determines appearance to be such; but if at the same time the external real object itself remains unaltered and unaffected, then the appearance (determined by apprehension) and the object (unaffected thereby) can be no degree identical; and there is thus set up a dualism between the real object and the appearance; a dualism which, again, if the appearance is but the incomplete way in which reality is known, is unfounded; for an incomplete entity is not, merely on that account, distinct from the complete, but rather the contrary.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Proposiciones relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofía. JOSÉ INGENIEROS. Buenos Aires: Casa Vaccaro. 1918. Pp. 149.

This work is very interesting and instructive, and it is perhaps the most truly philosophical work that has ever been written in South America.

The author has already published a good many works, most of them being on sociological subjects, and has contributed important articles to the *Revista de Filosofía*, of Buenos Aires.

In this last work of his, he does not intend to give us a system of philosophy. His aim is more modest. He simply formulates a certain number of propositions which he believes are to be the basis of the metaphysics of the future.

According to the author, all past attempts at metaphysics have been a decided failure. This has been due to the fact that metaphysicians have been insincere. A whole chapter of the work is devoted to the so-called "hypocrisy of the philosophers." These philosophers, frightened by the memory of Socrates, Hypatia and Bruno, have always endeavored to harmonize their systems with vulgar beliefs, religious as well as political. And their philosophy

has thus been hypocritical and has brought discredit upon the very name of metaphysics. Among the philosophers thus branded by our author, we find all those we had been taught to regard as the leaders of human thought, Descartes and Spinoza, Locke and Hume, Kant and Hegel.

The metaphysicians of the nineteenth century, discouraged by the failure of their predecessors, have turned their eyes toward the history of philosophy. They have tried to bring back to life old systems of thought; and here again they have gone in a wrong direction. The study of previous systems may be important to make us understand the origin of actual beliefs; but it ought to be regarded by the philosopher as paleontology by the naturalist. It may and will explain dead forms of thought, but it can not contribute any vital element to the creation of new thought.

Human knowledge must have its starting point in experience. It is experience, and experience alone, that legitimates the different sciences and furthers their development. Human experience, however, will always be limited. However perfect our instruments may become, there will always exist a field which they will be unable to reach. It is with this field, which the author calls the unexperiential, that future metaphysics will be concerned. Its aim will be to formulate hypotheses with regard to the unexperiential. Where science is unable to reach, metaphysical hypotheses will start. And thus there will be no chasm, no discontinuity between empirical and metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysics will not be science, but it will be its prolongation. And metaphysical hypotheses will be legitimate in so far as they agree with the "least insecure" results afforded by science.

The first impression which one gets on reading Mr. Ingenieros's book is that the author is a true philosopher; or, at any rate, that he possesses in an eminent degree the quality which is most essential to philosophy, namely, absolute freedom of thought. This quality, even in the twentieth century, is far from being so common as one might believe; and we know too well that in our free America there are not many institutions which would admit a man as an instructor in philosophy, unless he belongs to a definite religious sect. Sometimes, however, Mr. Ingenieros seems to go too far in the opposite direction, and to believe too readily that past thinkers have been insincere. I will not easily be persuaded that St. Thomas Aquinas—to mention one of those that are most suspicious—has not been perfectly sincere in his system of philosophy. His beliefs on many questions were no doubt very different from ours; and he may have been mistaken; but this is not the question. Whenever he

derived an argument from theology, it was by no means as a concession to vulgar beliefs; but because he himself sincerely believed that theological arguments, being based upon the word of God, which is infallible, were safer guides towards the attainment of truth than the fallible light of human reason.

Mr. Ingenieros seems also to call into doubt the knowledge which modern philosophers possess of the systems they defend. He tells us that the Kantists praise their master more than they read him; and he is not sure that anybody has ever read the "Summa" of St. Thomas. If I am not mistaken, we sin rather in the opposite direction. We read too much and think too little. If we study, for instance, the problem of free will, we are anxious to read even the most obscure German dissertation about the question, but we are not sure that we have a definite opinion of our own. At any rate, I have read several times the three Critiques of Kant and the two "Summas" of Thomas Aquinas, and I have no doubt that many of my colleagues have done the same.

A more fundamental criticism can be made on Mr. Ingenieros's book. His very conception of the nature of philosophy is open to serious objection. According to his view, the aim of philosophy is to formulate hypotheses about the unexperiential. Philosophy thus becomes a mere prolongation of the sciences. If our instruments were imperfect and our scientific knowledge limited, the field of philosophy would be very extensive. The more our scientific knowledge increases, the narrower will the field of philosophy become. And if our scientific knowledge should become so complete as to embrace all nature in all its manifestations, philosophy would automatically disappear. There is no philosophy for a Divine Mind.

This conception of philosophy seems to us too narrow. No doubt philosophy is bound to formulate hypotheses about the unexperiential; but this is only a small part of its task. Its essential nature is different from the nature of science. For whereas science studies the different kinds of being, philosophy studies being in general. What is being? What is cause? What is substance? These are questions which are beyond the field of the scientist. The physicist will tell us that matter is made up of atoms—or of electrons—but what the nature of these ultimate parts of matter is, whether they are material or mental, and what is matter, and what is mind, these are the questions which the philosopher will treat. In Mr. Ingenieros's system, philosophy ceases to be "*ancilla theologiæ*," but I am afraid it becomes "*ancilla scientiarum*."

The task of the philosopher in formulating new hypotheses is studied with great skill by Mr. Ingenieros, and the chapters of his

work which deal with this task of future metaphysics are very important. They are original, of course, only to a limited extent. A good deal of emphasis has been recently laid down, especially by the pragmatists, upon the importance of hypothesis in philosophy. And we do not see exactly why Mr. Ingenieros, whose views on the point are not very different from those of William James, nevertheless mentions him among the pseudo-philosophers, and speaks of his anti-philosophism. It is even a question whether James's theory as regards hypotheses is not after all more perfect than the theory now given by Mr. Ingenieros. James has at least a definite criterion to determine the value of a hypothesis. The true hypothesis in his system is the one which works. In Mr. Ingenieros's book, on the other hand, we are looking in vain for a mark which will stamp our hypotheses as legitimate. He tells us that they must agree with the least insecure results afforded by science. But, as all these hypotheses are about the unexperiential, it is not very easy to see how any agreement can be found between them and what has been experienced.

In spite of all this, Mr. Ingenieros's book is a very important contribution to philosophical literature. It is a work which compels us to think upon the great questions which have engrossed the human mind since the age when man began to think; and, if I am not mistaken, this is the most essential character of a great philosophical work.

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Locke's Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations. JAMES GIBSON. Cambridge University Press. 1917. Pp. 338.

If there be such a thing as a definitive commentary on an epistemologist, Mr. Gibson may fairly be credited with having provided such a work on Locke. The book is such an excellent one that the reviewer is tempted to confine his remarks to words of praise. Considerations of space prevent the detailed account that the rich content of the book merits. The reviewer will therefore confine himself to an account of the author's main thesis.

More than once it has happened that a philosopher has been victimized by a traditional interpretation that became established at an early date and has thereafter prevented commentators and historians from placing his work in its proper perspective. Mr. Gibson evidently regards Locke as one whose thought has been obscured in this way, and his book is a vigorous and eminently successful effort to dispel the obscurity that has grown up about Locke's epistemology.